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McWee v. Weldon
283 F.3d 179 (4th Cir. 2002)
LFaro
On July 6, 1991, in a rural South Carolina convenience store, JerryMcWee
("McWee") shot and killed a store clerk. Afterwards, he and his accomplice,
George Wade Scott, stole some cigarettes, a gun, and money from the cash
register. Later, McWee admitted to shooting the clerk twice- the first time by
"accident," and the second time by"mistake."1 The jury found McWee guilty of
murder and armed robbery, and imposed the death sentence?
Before juryselection began, McWee's attorneys asked the court for permis-
sion to question potential jury members about their understanding of the terms
"life imprisonment" and "parole eligibility." During that conversation, the trial
judge initially indicated that he would later charge the jury on the meaning of
parole eligibility' The trial judge, the prosecutor, and McWee's attorneys all
agreed that if the jury requested the statute, its request would be granted.' The
statute would have informed the jurythat McWee could have faced death or life
imprisonment; life imprisonment required a mandatory minimum term of
imprisonment for thirty 3ears s The conversation continued and the trial judge
reserved judgment on whether he would instruct the jury on parole eligibility.
The judge continued to bar McWee's attorneys from discussing parole eligibility
during the jury selection.'
During the penalty phase, McWee's attorneys decided not to delve into
McWee's mental illness and instead focused upon McWee's sense of responsibil-
ity and remorse for his actions. To that end, McWee himself testified during the
penalty phase that he felt "regret" for his actions and that he was "extremely
remorseful for the course of events." Based upon this strategy, the attorneys
decided to conduct onlya limited investigation into McWee's background. They
1. State v. McWee, 472 S.Eld 235,237 (S.C 1996) ("McWeP').
2. McWee v. Weldon, 283 F3d 179, 182 (4th CAr. 2002) ("McWeel).
3. Id at 182.
4. Joint Appendix at 17, McWee v. Weldon, 283 F.3d 179 (4th CAr. 2002) (No. 01-21) (this
fact is not recited in the court's opinion).
5. See S.C CODE ANN. S 16-3-20(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993) (providing that a person
convicted of murder must be punished by death, life imprisonment, or by a mandatory minimum
term of imprisonment for thirtyyears).
6. McWeeI, 283 F.3d at 182.
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did not explore McWee's familyrnedical record, which later revealed an extensive
familyhistoryof mental illness that could have been used as mitigating evidence."
McWee's attorneys did put on some mental health mitigating evidence.
They called Dr. John Whitley, a psychiatric expert who had examined McWee
eight times. He opined that McWee suffered from"severe depression," "psycho-
sis," and "command hallucinations." Dr. Whitleydid not express an opinion that
McWee lacked an understanding of the judicial proceedings or the ability to
determine moral or legal right from wrong.8 The defense counsel also questioned
a state psychiatrist, Dr. Donald Morgan, who testified that it was his opinion that
McWee was malingering.9
The trial judge instructed the juryto give plain and ordinarymeaning to the
terms "life imrisonment" and "death penalty." " Two minutes into the jury's
sentencing deliberations, it asked the court how many years a defendant would
have to serve before he became parole eligible. 1 The judge did not give an
instruction regarding the statutory thirty year minimum; rather, he repeated that
life and death were to be given their ordinary meanings. Defense counsel took
exception and the exception was overruled. 2 At the close of the penaltyphase,
McWee was sentenced to death."
On direct appeal to the Supreme Court of South Carolina, McWee claimed
that his due process and Eighth Amendment rights were violated when the trial
judge refused to charge the jury with an explanation of parole eligibility" The
Supreme Court of South Carolina ruled that the judge's initial vacillation did not
influence voir dire, jury selection, or the presentation of the defendant's case-in-
chief."5 The court further held that because a life sentence for McWee could
have included the possibility of parole, Sinn v Scm, Ciind 6 did not require
the trial judge to explain parole eligibility to the jury.
7
In the state post-conviction review proceeding, McWee claimed that his
attorneys were ineffective because they failed to raise the issues of incompetency
7. Ide at 187-88.
8. Id at 185.
9. aL
10. Id at 183.
11. McWeel,472 S.2d at 238;seeAppendixat252,McWee(No.01-21) (asling "underSouth
Carolina law is there a minimum number of yars that must be served of a life sentence before
eligibility for parole").
12. McWWI, 472 S.E.2d at 238; sw Appendix at 253, 255, McWbe (No. 01-21).
13. McWw//, 283 F.3d at 182.
14. McW&I, 472 SE.2d at 238.
15. Id
16. 512 US. 154 (1994).
17. McWe , 472 S.E.2d at 238; sw Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 US. 154, 169 (1994)
(hokling that when the defendant is parole ineligible and future dangerousness has been introduced,




and insanity." Dr. Whitleytestified again, and this time emphasized that, in fact,
McWee was not competent to stand trial and lacked the capacityto tell right from
wrong at the time of the shooting. Dr. Whitley stated that McWee's attorneys
never inquired about their client's competencyto stand trial or the possibility of
an insanity defense. 9 The post-conviction review court held a specific factual
determination and concluded that McWee's attorneys had indeed asked Dr.
Whitley "if there were any mental health defenses available to McWee."20 The
post-conviction review court also found that, given the attorneys' strategy of
responsibilityand regret, their cursoryinvestigation of McWee's background had
been reasonable."1 McWee appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of South
Carolina and lost. After being denied a writ of habeas corpus in federal district
court, McWee sought a certificate of appealability in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth C-cuit.'
II. Hdding
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Grcuit denied the
motion for a certificate of appealability.23 It found that McWee was not entitled
to a writ of habeas corpus because the state court decisions were neither contrary
to, nor an unreasonable application of, federal law.2' First, the court held that the
state court's refusal to charge the jurywith specific parole eligibilityinstructions
did not contradict Simnm. Second, the court concluded that the state post-
conviction review court properly applied StmiLvadv Waszhji 6 in determining
that counsel was not ineffective."
IML A ni /is Aplic in Vogmia
A. Due Pnmss
The Fourth Crcuit rejected McWee's claim that his due process rights were
violated when the trial judge, despite his initial indication to the contrary, refused
18. McWeeII, 283 F.3d at 184.
19. Id at 185.
20. Id at 186.
21. Id at 188.
22. Id at 182.
23. Id
24. McWII, 283 F.3d at 182; sae28 US.C S 2254(d)(1) (2000) (stating that a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to a state court decision can onlybe granted if the state court decision was contrary
to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal lw, part of the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996).
25. McWw II, 283 F.3d at 184; see Sinm,, 512 U.S. at 156.
26. 466 US. 668 (1984).
27. McWwI, 283 F.3d at 186;seeStrickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687(1984) (holding




to define parole eligibility. 8 The court found that McWee mischaracterized the
judge's statements and that the judge had never made a promise.29 Moreover, the
Fourth Circuit did not find error in the Supreme Com of South Carolina's
conclusion that the trial judge's initial indication had "no influence on voir dire,
juryselection, or presentation of the evidence.""0 McWee's claim arose primarily
from the last statement the trial judge made about giving the requested charge,
"[W]e'll address ... at a later time whether or not you want that in your general
charge." 1 The Fourth Circuit did not consider that the words "you want" could
have left an impression with the defense counsel that they would be able to
choose whether parole eligibilitywould be mentioned in the jurycharge. Nor did
the court explain how it reached the conclusion that this statement had no
influence on the ensuing proceedings. As a practical matter, the court seems to
be saying that in Due Process review it is not necessary to reconsider any evi-
dence of actual prejudice.
The compelling gap in the Fourth Circuit's discussion is the fact that it
never addressed the separate promise the judge made to charge the statute upon
request of the jury. This promise was not retracted, clearly affected an issue at
the forefront of the jury's deliberation, and was ignored in the Fourth Circuit's
opinion. The court emphasized that Smnm does not require an explicit instruc-
tion if the defendant is parole eligible. 2 Sinrn goes on, however, to state that
a "plain and ordinary" meaning explanation "does nothing to dispel the misun-
derstanding reasonable jurors may have about the way in which any particular
state defines 'life imprisonment."" The jury's question regarding the terms of
life imprisonment indicated that it had a reasonable misunderstanding as to how
South Carolina defined life imprisonment. If a plain and ordinary meaning
explanation was inadequate to satisfya questioning jury's confusion surrounding
the term life imprisonment, it is unclear how the same instruction is adequate to
explain the terms of parole eligibility. The fact that the juryasked such a specific
question indicates that, given the knowledge that McWee would not be released
at least until the age of seventyone, it might have sentenced him differently. The
juryin this case might have made a "false choice." 4 The implications of this void
in the court's discussion point out that the Fourth Circuit will not consider actual
jury confusion as proof of a Due Process violation.




32. Ia at 184.
33. Srm=n, 512 U.S. at 170.
34. l at 161 (stating that "to the extent this misunderstanding pervaded the jury's delibera-
tions, it had the effect of creating a false choice between sentencing petitioner to death and
sentencing him to a limited period of incarceration").
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B. 7he Simmons Imaim
The Fourth Qrcuit emphasized that when the defendant is parole eligible,
that eligibility nullifies any requirement for a life-means-life instruction." This
issue generally does not arise in Virginia. The Supreme Court of Virginia's
mandate in Yebrd v Cwnw 9 requires a life-means-life instruction inthe
prosecution of all capital murders committed after the abolition of parole.
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit's decision not to require a parole-eligibility
instruction could come up in the event of a "cold hit" on a murder committed
prior to January 1, 1995. If the police enter a current felony suspect's DNA or
ingerprints into the state database and receive a "cold hit" linking the suspect to
a capital crime committed prior to January 1,1995, the defendant would still be
parole eligible." In this instance, the suspect could be treated much the same
way as McWee- because he is parole-eligible, the judge cannot instruct that life-
means-life and apparentlyis not required to instruct on parole eligibility. Defen-
dants who are charged with crimes committed prior to 1995 should not expect
to be granted an instruction on parole eligibility.
C Applim2mcfStricland
1. CcwpmVr/ Sanity
The Fourth Circuit applied the Stridekrstandard to address McWee's Sixth
Amendment claims. 9 On McWee's first purported violation, that counsel failed
to contest the defendant's competency or sanity, the court set out the two-part
StrLvid standard.' The Fourth Circuit relied on 28 U.S.C S 2254(e)(1) to defer
35. McWe II, 283 F.3d at 184.
36. 519 S.E.2d 602 (Va. 1999).
37. Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 602,616 (Va. 1999) (holding that, upon the
defendant's request, the trial court must instruct the jury that life imprisonment means life impris-
onment without parole); VA. CODE ANN. 5 19.2-264.4(A) (Mfichie 2000) (providing that, upon the
defendant's request, the jury will be instructed that the defendant shall not receive parole if
sentenced to life in prison for a crime committed after January 1, 1995).
38. Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 US. 156,159 (2000) (holding that a Sirnm instruction need
not be extended to defendants whose parole ineligibilityis not yet final). The prosecutor in Rrdass
argued future dangerousness and the defendant was sentenced to death, during the sentencing
proceedings, the defendant was found guilty of armed robbery in a separate proceeding which
eventually made him ineligible forparole under Vrginia' s three-strikes rule. Id at 162-63. The
armed robberyconviction was not, however, a final judgment at the time of the defendant's capital
sentencing; therefore, the defendant was not considered parole ineligible and a Smirrm instruction
was not given. Id at 167.
39. McWMeII, 283 F.3d at 186.
40. Id at 186-88; see Stridi&a 466 U.S. at 687 (defining the two-part test as a "showing that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the




to the state court's finding of fact.41 The state court concluded that McWee's
attorneys had indeed sought out Dr. Whitley's opinion regarding mental health
defenses. 2 The court then turned to the merits of McWee's claim. It pointed
brieflyto the fact that McWee was twice evaluated and twice declared competent
before trial began.43 The court then focused on McWee's conduct during the trial
and found that the trial record indicated that McWee was "unquestionably
competent to stand triaL" Therefore, counsels' decision not to contest compe-
tencywas reasonable and McWee's Sixth Amendment tights were not violated
The court held that the post-conviction review court reasonablyapplied Stui&Lard
when it rejected this claim.'
However, the court did not address the fact that Strik/ardurges that coun-
sels' decisions be reviewed in light of the facts counsel had at the time the
decision was made." McWee's competence at trial could not have factored into
counsels' pre-trial competency decision; yet, his competence factored into the
court's determination that counsel made a reasonable decision.4" The Fourth
Circuit gave the weight of its attention to factors that could not possibly have
entered into counsels' pre-trial decision- McWee's consultations with his lawyers
during the trial and his testimony on the stand- and used these factors to
contribute to its holding that counsels' initial decision fell within "reasonable
professional assistance."49
The Fourth Ctrcuit continued to apply StrikLand as it evaluated McWee's
second claim- that counsels' decision not to put forward an insanity defense
violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective counselio The court relied on
McWee's statements to his attorneys regarding right and wrong and pointed out
that Dr. Whitley did not change his testimony until the post-conviction stage."1
The court found that the "heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments"
required in Strixkai cast counsels' strategic decision to focus on McWee's
remorse as reasonable assistance.5 2 Therefore, the Fourth Crcuit found that the
41. McWeeI,283 F.3dat 186; see28 US.C S2254(e)(1) (2000) (statingthatwhenadefendant
lies for a writ of habeas corpus, state court determinations of fact are presumed to be correct
the petitioner must rebut the presumption by clear and convincing evidence).





47. StrkI/an, 466 US. at 690 (stating that "a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim
must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts 6f the particular case,
viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct").
48. McWbeII, 283 F.3d at 186.
49. Id at 185 (quoting Stri zar 466 U.S. at 689).
50. Id at 186-87.
51. Id at 187-88.
52. Id at 188 (quoting Stki&/ani 466 US. at 691).
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post-conviction review court reasonably applied StridLad in rejecting this
portion of McWee's ineffective assistance of counsel claim."
2. Mitin
McWee claimed that his attorneys should have investigated further into his
family to uncover a history of mental illness to use as mitigating evidence, and
that their decision not to do so constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The
Fourth Grcuit found that counsels' scarcity of time and resources while prepar-
ing for the penaltyphase bolstered their decision to pursue remorse as their most
effective course for mitigation." The court based its finding on Stridards
directive that counsel has a dutyto make reasonable investigations or reasonable
decisions to limit investigation."
The court further found that there would not have been a reasonable
probabilityof a different outcome even if counsels' decision had been different.'
The court reasoned that because counsel had made a strategic decision and some
mental health testimonydid reach the jury, there was not a reasonable probability
that a different outcome would have occurred. 7 Surprisingly, the court made no
mention of the United States Supreme Court's decision in W'1/iarri v Taor,s the
leading case on mitigation evidence, which did weigh the probability of a differ-
ent outcome." McWee did not have the extreme gapsin mitigation evidence that
ultimatelyled to a reversal in Wi/ia=. ' McWee did, however, have an argument
that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been
different, but for the lack of mitigating evidence. The State's psychiatrist testified
during the sentencing phase that McWee was malingering. 61 This testimony
undermined both the defendant and the testimony of Dr. Whidey. If counsel
had presented mitigating evidence to support a strong history of mental illness,
it is possible that the testimony of both the defendant and Dr. Whitley would
have played a more credible role in the jury's deliberations and the ultimate
outcome. The court did not weigh this factor as part of its analysis surrounding
53. Id
54. McWeeII, 283 F.3d at 188-89.
55. Id at 188 (quoting Styidharj 466 US. at 691).
56. Id at 189.
57. Id at 188-89.
58. 529 US. 362 (2000).
59. See~Wrliams v. Taylor, 529 US. 362,396,399 (2000) (hokling that when defense counsel
failed to include mitigating evidence there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome and
the defendant's constitutional rights to effective counsel had been violated). The omitted mitigating
evidence included the folowing: records that demonstrated the defendant was physically abused
by his parents, removed from their care due to criminal neglect, abused in foster care, returned to
his parents, found to be borderline mentally retarded, and testimony asserting he helped crack a
prison drug ring and returned a prison guard's wallet. Id at 395-96.
60. Id at 399.
61. McWeel, 283 F.3d at 185.
2002]
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a reasonable probability of a different outcome.' In so doing, the court con-
veyed the message that the standard for "reasonable probability" is high; yet, it
remains unclear what level of missing mitigation evidence will meet such a
standard.
The Fourth Grcuit stated, "[Tihis is not a case where counsel's failure to
thoroughlyinvestigate kept the jurycompletelyin the dark as to McWee's alleged
mental problems."6' The fact that counsel did offer testimony of MeWee's
mental problems is treated with some importance.6 The court here implied that
perhaps a similar strategic choice that kept the jury from hearing any mental
health mitigators would not have met the Stik/dri test.
IV. Qndusion
The chances of a capital defendant being parole eligible have been statutorily
diminished; nevertheless, for those who are still covered, a parole eligibility
instruction is all but impossible. Even when the jury voiced specific confusion
over parole and its effects, the Fourth Crcuit refused to apply the benefits of
Sbwio. 6 In Virginia, the three strikes rule required two final judgments in
order for a defendant to be considered parole ineligible. The Court in Ranxtas
would not require an instruction to the jury on parole eligibility because the
defendant's other convictions had not reached final judgment at the time of
capital sentencing.6 The holding in Randass informs attorneys that a capital trial
should not proceed until a final judgment has been reached on all other offenses.
Reading Ranrass in conjunction with the court's refusal to instruct on parole
eligibility in McWee underscores the importance of delaying the capital trial until
all other final judgments have been reached.
The Fourth Crcuit's application of StrikLrvi is equally strict. Strickari
provides language that grants wide deference to counsel; yet, there are mitigation
gaps that constitute ineffective assistance. McWW reveals some insight into how
the Fourth Gaviit applies Stridlard- that is, counsel has significant freedom to
make strategic choices, but counsel may also be expected to reveal potential
mental health mitigators to the jury.
Janice L. Kopec
62. Id at 188-89.
63. Id at 189.
64. Id
65. Id at 190, Mcwl, 472 S.E.2d at 238.
66. Ramizs, 530 US. at 167.
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